Overview

CISA republished Siemens ProductCERT advisory SSA-137528 as ICSA-26-302-01 on 29 October 2026; Siemens’ initial release was 26 October. The advisory covers one flaw, CVE-2026-89209, in the Mendix SAML module: it does not properly protect against SAML assertion replay in IdP-initiated authentication flows. CISA lists the affected sectors as Critical Manufacturing and Information Technology, deployed worldwide, with Siemens headquartered in Germany.

Why OT teams should care: Siemens describes the SAML module as the component that lets a Mendix cloud application authenticate users against any SAML 2.0 or Shibboleth identity provider. Plants that build MES, operator portals, maintenance or asset-tracking apps on Mendix and front them with corporate SSO may be using this module (our assessment). Whether any specific plant does is a question for its own app inventory; neither advisory names OT deployments.

Vulnerability details

FieldDetail
CVECVE-2026-89209
WeaknessCWE-294, Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
CVSS v3.16.8 Medium, AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVSS v4.07.6 High, AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
ReporterSiemens ProductCERT, per CISA

Per both advisories, affected versions do not properly protect against SAML assertion replay in IdP-initiated flows. An unauthenticated remote attacker who replays a valid SAML response can gain unauthorized access to the application. “Unauthenticated” does not mean trivial: the vectors rate attack complexity as high (AC:H) and require user interaction (UI:R in v3.1, UI:P in v4.0), which we read as the attacker needing a captured valid assertion and a user-side step. Siemens does not spell this out.

In IdP-initiated SSO, the identity provider sends the browser to the application with an unsolicited assertion, so the application never issued a request that the response must match. Our assessment: that is why replay protection matters most in this flow, and why Siemens’ mitigation targets it. Siemens does not describe the internal mechanism, and we have not seen the module’s code.

Scoring source: the 6.8 and 7.6 scores come from Siemens, which is the CNA for the CVE and the author of SSA-137528. CISA’s page shows only the v3.1 score (6.8) in its headline. NVD (status Deferred, checked 2026-11-12) has no NVD-assigned score and lists Siemens’ two scores as Secondary. The v4.0 score is higher than v3.1; the vectors differ in how user interaction is expressed (UI:R in v3.1, UI:P in v4.0).

Affected and fixed versions

ProductAffectedFixed
Mendix SAML (Mendix 9 compatible)All versions below V3.6.29V3.6.29 or later
Mendix SAML (Mendix 10 compatible)All versions below V4.2.4V4.2.4 or later
Mendix SAML (Mendix 11 compatible)All versions below V4.2.4V4.2.4 or later

Siemens points to Mendix Marketplace component 1174 for the updates. CISA, Siemens and the CVE record agree on all version ranges. CISA’s headline table lists only the Mendix 10 product, but its detail section covers all three.

Exploitation status

We found no evidence of exploitation as of 2026-11-12 in the CISA advisory, Siemens SSA-137528, the CVE record, NVD, or the CISA KEV catalog (version 2026.11.10, released 2026-11-10, which does not list CVE-2026-89209). The CISA-ADP entry on the CVE record carries SSVC values of Exploitation: none, Automatable: no, Technical Impact: total (timestamp 2026-10-31). None of these sources mentions a public proof of concept, and we did not search for one elsewhere. Absence from these sources is not proof that no attacks have occurred.

Mitigations and actions

Vendor mitigation and fix (Siemens, repeated by CISA):

  • Update to Mendix SAML V4.2.4 or later (Mendix 10 and 11) or V3.6.29 or later (Mendix 9).
  • Where updating is not immediately possible, disable IdP-initiated SSO.
  • Follow Siemens’ general recommendations: protect network access with appropriate mechanisms and configure the environment according to Siemens’ operational guidelines for Industrial Security.

CISA recommended practices: minimize network exposure for control system devices and systems so they are not reachable from the internet; keep control system networks behind firewalls and isolated from business networks; use more secure methods such as VPNs for remote access, keeping in mind that VPNs can themselves be vulnerable and are only as secure as the connected devices.

Our assessment (not from Siemens or CISA):

  • Inventory Mendix applications and check which have the SAML module installed and what version. The module is a Marketplace component, so it may not appear in a standard asset or patch inventory.
  • Check your identity provider configuration for whether IdP-initiated SSO is enabled for these apps. If users only ever start from the application’s own login page, SP-initiated flow may be sufficient; confirm with the application owners before switching, since disabling IdP-initiated SSO will break portal-launch tiles.
  • Review application authentication logs for repeated logins from the same assertion or from unexpected source addresses since the module was deployed. Assertion IDs are only visible if the app or IdP logs them, which we have not verified for this module.

What is not known

The advisories do not state how an attacker would obtain a valid SAML response (for example from logs, a proxy, or a compromised browser), what lifetime of assertion makes replay practical, or whether SP-initiated flows are affected. Siemens’ wording limits the flaw to IdP-initiated flows, and that is the only scope we can support.

References

Tags
SiemensMendixSAMLCWE-294authentication bypassSSOICSA-26-302-01SSA-137528